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Following the First World War, the 
tide of public opinion was overwhelm-
ingly against the submarine as a weapon 
of war. The excesses of the German 
U-boat had stunned the sensibilities of 
the world but had, nonetheless, pre-
sented new ideas and possibilities of this 
weapon to the various naval powers of 
the time. The momentum of these new 
ideas proved so strong that by the 
opening of the first major international 
disarmament conference of the 20th 
century, practical uses of the submarine 
had all but smothered the moral indig-
nation of 1918. 
Several months prior to the opening 
of the conference, the General Board of 
the American Navy was given the task 
of developing guidelines and recommen-
dations to be used by the State Depart-
ment in determining the American 
proposals to be presented. The orien-
tation of this group, simply stated, was 
that second best in naval strength meant 
last. A policy of naval superiority was 
necessary, they felt, for "history consis-
tently shows that war between no two 
peoples or nations can be unthink-
able.,,1 A second group, the Naval 
Advisory Committee (Admirals Pratt 
and Coontz and Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) also 
submitted recommendations concerning 
the limitation of naval armaments. 
From the outset their deliberations were 
guided by a concern that had become 
more and more apparent-the threat 
posed to the security and interests of 
this country by Japan. This concern was 
evidenced in an attempt to gain basic 
understandings with Britain. 
The submarine received its share of 
attention in the deliberations of these 
two groups. One approach to the 
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weapon, considered in a draft proposal 
submitted by Capt. F.H. Schofield, 
called for the total and permanent 
abolition of submarines and the destruc-
tion of all submarines, built and build-
ing. 2 In support of his proposal, Scho-
field noted that the relative strengths of 
the world's navies would not be materi-
ally affected by such a move, and 
increasing the numbers of submarines 
would involve large expenditures for 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels. 
However, save this one proposal, the 
elimination of any armament by type 
received scant attention in these early 
recommendations as it was thought to 
hold little promise of success.3 
A second approach to the problem 
was to scrap submarines then in exis-
tence and place restrictions upon new 
construction, thereby establishing maxi-
mum tonnage allowances in vessel types 
permitted each power. The Advisory 
Committee drew up three plans in-
volving this basic principle and sub-
mitted them to the General Board and 
the Secretary of the Navy on 20 Octo-
ber 1921. Under plan I the submarine 
tonnage recommended for this country 
and England was a maximum of 90,000 
tons, while Japan, France, and Italy 
were each allotted' 54,000 tons.4 Those 
submarines building at the time of the 
Conference could be completed up to 
the assigned tonnage, but no new con-
struction would be permitted except to 
replace those units reaching 12 years of 
service. Plans II and III were quite 
similar to plan I but for the maximum 
allowed tonnage (85,000 tons for Eng-
land and the United States and 51,000 
tons for the other powers). The Navy 
Department was of the opinion that 
plan I "is the best plan and is the one 
which ... it advises be adopted."s 
A memorandum prepared for the 
General Board by Capt. H.H. Bemis of 
the Submarine Section of the Office of 
Naval Operations expressed the opinion 
of those professionals who favored re-
tention of the submarine. After citing 
the improyed capabilities and the pri-
mary uses of the submarine, Bemis 
opposed its abolition " ... chiefly on 
account of the impossibility of doing 
SO.,,6 "History," continued Bemis, 
"shows only· too well the value of a 
'scrap of paper' when the life of a 
nation is at stake." Alluding to England, 
he also noted that, "Two weapons are 
now in hand that challenge her su-
premacy, one of which is the submarine, 
and, naturally, she would be glad to see 
that 'outlawed. ,,, In concluding this 
section of his memorandum, Captain 
Bemis observed that relative to the 
Pacific, "the United States will make a 
criminal mistake if she becomes a party 
to an agreement to abolish sub-
marines. ,,7 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Roosevelt expressed his agreement with 
Bemis in a paper entitled "Limitation of 
Armaments." "In an assumed war 
against the world," he wrote, "the 
submarine would be of most value 
... against the two island empires-
Great Britain and Japan." It was impera-
tive that we "not permit our hands to 
be tied as regards submarines."s 
In this same paper Roosevelt ob-
served that Japan was our most proba-
ble enemy at present, and if the Con-
ference did not provide us with a 
dominating naval strength in the Pacific, 
we should conclude a "treaty such that 
Japan cannot break it as regards us 
without breaking it with others." In 
other words, an "entangling alliance." 
With an eye on the development of new 
weapons, Roosevelt wrote that the 
United States should be the " ... last 
nation to advocate any limitation upon 
the extension of recent weapons or the 
development of new ones.,,9 The Presi-
dent, Secretary of the Navy Hughes, and 
Roosevelt agreed that disarmament was 
an impossible objective and that the 
reduction or limitation of armaments 
was all that could be hoped for. 
The independently formulated Gen-
eral Board plans were, however, un-
acceptable to Hughes and Roosevelt for 
they were, as Roosevelt noted years 
later, "what one would have expected 
from the Naval Board-an estimate of 
limitations (based) on' 'naval needs,' 
which represented not a limitation of 
armaments for the United States but an 
increase.',10 Such a plan was folly, and 
Roosevelt decided to consult Admiral 
Pratt whom he thought to be "the 
ablest naval statesman," and together 
they hit upon and developed the idea of 
using existing naval strength as the basis 
for the American proposals. 
The plan laid before the Conference 
by Hughes at the first plenary session 
detailed a reduction and limitation of 
naval armaments for Great Britain, the 
United States, and Japan in a ratio of 
5:5:3, respectively, but left the ratio for 
Italy and France for the Conference to 
determine. 11 Tonnage limitations con-
sistent with the 5:5:3 ratio were as-
signed for each type of vessel with the 
submarine tonnage allotment being the 
same as that allowed in plan I of the 
Advisory Committee (Le., 90,000 tons 
for Great Britain and the United States 
and 54,000 tons for Japan). 1 2 
At the second plenary session (15 
November) the representatives of the 
various countries presented their replies 
to the American proposals. Arthur J. 
Balfour, representing the British Em-
pire, noted the willingness of his coun-
try to accept the naval ratio suggested 
by Hughes but made such acceptance 
conditional upon the continued su-
premacy of England in European 
waters. The British also wished to retain 
complete freedom in the building of 
cruisers and other auxiliary types and 
limit only their battle fleet or capital 
ships.13 This disagreement regarding 
cruisers was to plague Anglo-American 
relations for years following the Wash-
ington Conference and emphasized the 
differences between the roles and needs 
of these two naval powers. Great 
Britain, with a large global empire, 
needed both a battle fleet and a large 
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number of commerce escort vessels, 
while the primary concern of the Ameri-
can Navy was defense of the continental 
United States. 
Proceeding to the limitations pro-
posed for submarines, Balfour reported 
that his country's experts thought the 
amount of submarine tonnage permitted 
was too large. He thought that the 
tonnage should be reduced further and 
suggested that the Conference might 
possibly "forbid altogether the con-
struction of those ... submarines of 
great size ... whose sole purpose is at-
tack ... by methods which civilized na-
tions regard with horror."14 Only 
fleeting reference was made to the 
abolition of the submarine and then 
only to note that such a decision 
"would be impossible, or, if possible, it 
might well be thought undesirable to 
abolish it altogether. ,,15 
Delegations from the other countries 
at this second public meeting of the 
Conference voiced general satisfaction 
with the American proposals, but their 
remarks, and particularly those of 
France and Japan, indicated that each 
nation expected special consideration 
because of its particular situation (e.g., 
geography, current naval strength, na-
tional interests, et cetera). 
Two memorandums prepared for the 
American representatives contained 
what eventually became the basic posi-
tion of the United States regarding the 
question of submarine limitation used 
for the remainder of the Conference. A 
General Board memorandum (No. 43B, 
ser. 1088-dd) transmitted to the Secre-
tary of the Navy on 15 November 
assumed that while unrestricted subma-
rine warfare was indeed to be abolished, 
the submarine itself was an "effective 
and legitimate weapon of warfare." The 
depredations visited upon the world by 
the submarine in the last war were to be 
prevented from recurring not by out-
lawing the weapon but by clearly de-
fining the rules under which the subma-
rine was to operate in time of war. 
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The second memorandum, prepared 
by Capt. Sinclair Cannon of Colonel 
Roosevelt's staff, responded to several 
questions regarding the submarine that 
had been raised during the first meeting 
of the Subcommittee of Technical Ex-
perts (16 November) and was explicit as 
to why this country should retain a 
strong submarine force. The British had 
proposed that the tonnage be reduced 
from 90,000 tons to 45,000 tons for 
both themselves and the United States 
and that Japan be allotted 27,000 tons 
as opposed to the 54,000 tons originally 
proposed by the United States. In his 
memorandum to the Director of War 
Plans, Captain Cannon advised that such 
a substitution should not be allowed. 
One reason he discussed was the defense 
of the American island possessions in 
the Pacific where he considered the 
submarine an absolute necessity.16 In 
the event of hostilities in the Pacific, 
observed Cannon, "the presence of sub-
marines with our fleet would be of vital 
iIpportance . ~ ... 17 The submarine as-a 
determining f§lC!or in future operations 
of the British Navy also received Can-
non's attention. With submarines re-
duced to a minimum, observed the 
captain, the British Fleet would be more 
at liberty to carry on offensive opera-
tions in the event of war, whereas, "if 
submarines are allowed, that fact in 
itself might prevent Great Britain from 
going to war ...... 18 
Although agreed upon in theory, the 
specific provisions of the proposed limi-
tation ratio among the three major 
powers proved to be a source of con-
tinuing difficulty. With certain reserva-
tions, Great Britain accepted the ratio 
of 5:5:3 (10:10:6) as originally set 
forth by Hughes, but Japan proved to 
be considerably more recalcitrant in 
arriving at an understanding. Demanding 
security in her own waters and dis-
satisfied with the assurances that a 
four-power consultative pact might pro-
vide (as a substitute for the now defunct 
Anglo-Japanese alliance), Japan insisted 
that a 10:10:7 ratio be instituted. The 
General Board saw such a ratio as 
placing Japan in a position to "carry 
forward her aggressive policies in the 
Far East, thereby endangering the peace 
of the world." 1 9 
The ratio deadlock was broken by 
permitting Japan to keep a new con-
struction battleship (Mutsu) originally 
slated for destruction and an agreement 
by England and the United States to 
nonfortification of their Pacific posses-
sions. 
Extending the ratio to France and 
Italy in the balanced proportion (1.67) 
also proved difficult. France demanded 
that she be allowed a ratio of 3.5, and 
Italy insisted on parity with France. 
After considerable debate and a per-
sonal appeal to Premier Briand by Secre-
tary Hughes, France accepted the 1.67 
ratio but made formal reservation to the 
extension of the limitation ratio to 
surface auxiliaries and to submarines 
which France considered to be of a 
purely defensive nature and necessary to 
insure her communications and se-
curity.2 0 It became evident that French 
strategy had called for concessions in 
the capital ship ratio argument to sup-
port their later demands for increased 
auxiliary tonnage and to "introduce the 
submarine controversy ... 2 1 
In spite of the acknowledged impor-
tance of the submarine limitation ques-
tion, both the United States and Great 
Britain chose to defer discussion until 
the capital ship ratios had been at least 
tentatively agreed upon. In response to 
a request by the Netherlands that she be 
granted a large allotment of submarine 
tonnage, Roosevelt recorded this inter-
pretation of the submarine ratio situa-
tion. "My view of the matter," wrote 
Roosevelt, 
is that we should get our estab-
lished ratio for the three major 
naval powers and stick to it religi-
ously. If we depart from it we will 
immediately get into a vexed 
situation [with] France ... Fun-
damentally England's real fear of 
France is based on submarine ton-
nage. If this were eliminated a 
mutual agreement would quickly 
be reached. [But if the Nether-
lands is allowed to build 45,000 
tons] I could foresee trouble at 
once. We are accordingly pre-
paring a reply for the State De-
partment in which we urge that 
the matter be held in abeyance, 
and that America stand as she has 
stood, upon the ratio established 
by the three great powers.2 2 
In addition, the General Board had 
indicated that the submarine tonnage 
proposed by the Secretary of State 
expressed the "maximum reduction in 
submarine armament to which the 
United States [could] subscribe.,,2 3 
It was common knowledge among 
the conferees that Great Britain wished 
to pursue her often stated goal of 
submarine abolition. On 19 December 
Secretary Hughes and Roosevelt dis-
cussed the British position. Both agreed 
that it was a "foolish thing" but, from 
their meetings with Lee and Balfour, it 
was clear that the British were "set on 
the matter." Lee had told Roosevelt 
that the English did not feel that bring-
ing the abolition question before the 
Conference would embarrass their posi-
tion because "at no time did they 
expect [that] a decision in this matter, 
contrary to what they consider correct, 
would force them to leave the con-
ference." The British were convinced 
that they would eventually have the 
submarine abolished by repeatedly ham-
mering at it.24 
That the French, however, were not 
prepared to outlaw the submarine was 
made clear 2 days later (21 December) 
when Roosevelt met with Admiral de 
Bon of the French delegation. The 
admiral informed Roosevelt that the 
French did not wish to "cut down on 
submarines" and asked for the "up-set 
figure" of American submarine needs, 
expressing his assumption that we 
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would want only about 60,000 tons.25 
Roosevelt was of the opinion that 
France would want at least as much and 
that to allow such an amount would be 
"as good as not cutting down at all." 
Nor would Britain "hear to 60,000 tons 
for the French.,,2 6 His conversation 
with de Bon only served to reinforce 
what he had felt for several days. "We 
will have to make our agreement on 
callital ships ... and let the auxiliary 
tonnage insofar as submarines [are con-
cerned] ... go, pass by the board, with 
certain restrictions.,,2 7 
The first extended discussion of sub-
marine limitation took place during the 
fifth meeting of the Committee on 
Limitation of Armament (22 December) 
where Albert Sarraut of the French 
delegation pointed out that further dis-
cussion of naval limitation "could not 
be pursued without taking into account 
the question of submarines.,,2 8 Lord 
Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the 
British Admiralty, noted that the ques-
tion of submarines was of "transcendent 
importance" to the British Empire, and 
he regretted that this appeared to be the 
only question on which his delegation 
was out of sympathy with the American 
proposals and the views of France and 
the other powers.29 Lee then presented 
figures to illustrate his contention that 
the American submarine proposals actu-
ally provided for an increase in the 
submarine fleets of the major powers.3 0 
In a lengthy statement designed to 
counter the prosubmarine arguments of 
the other powers, Lee recounted the 
wartime experience of the submarine 
and noted that its real value was, and 
would continue to be, its utility as a 
commerce destroyer. The submarine, 
Lee maintained, was essentially an of-
fensive weapon involving murder and 
piracy upon the seas. It was the only 
class of vessel for which the Conference 
was asked to give permission to thrive 
and multiply, and it would be a great 
disappointment to the British Empire if 
they could not persuade the Conference 
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to abolish this weapon.3 1 Lee then 
offered to scrap the entire British sub-
marine fleet of 80,000 tons, which was 
the "largest and probably the most 
efficient submarine navy in the world," 
provided the other powers would do 
likewise.3 2 The sympathies of the other 
nations were visibly prosubmarine, how-
ever, and Lee hardly expected to con-
vince all the powers to come round to 
the British point of view. With this in 
mind the British delegate noted that 
they had no intention of jeopardizing 
the capital ship agreement if they failed 
to carry the point regarding the subma-
rine and would, therefore, welcome any 
suggestions for the reduction and re-
striction of the submarine.3 3 
Following the presentation of the 
English case for abolition, the French 
representative Albert Sarraut presented 
his country's views on the submarine. 
His words reinforced the prosubmarine 
attitude the French had supported for 
many years. The submarine was an 
excellent defensive weapon, contended 
Sarraut, particularly for those nations 
without a large fleet of battleships. It 
was, therefore, an "excellent means of 
preserving her independence ... espe-
cially in view of the sacrifices to which 
she has been asked to consent in the 
matter of capital ships.,,3 4 As for the 
employment of the submarine in the 
war, noted Sarraut, there is "reason for 
condemning [the] belligerent, but not 
for condemning the submarine." The 
French spokesman concluded his re-
marks with the statement that 
... The French Government can-
not consent to accept either the 
abolition of submarines, or a re-
duction of the total tonnage of 
submarines which it considers to 
be the irreducible minimum neces-
sary to insure the safety of the 
territories for which it is respon-
sible, or a limitation of the in-
dividual tonnage of submarines. 3 5 
In somewhat briefer statements, the 
Italian and Japanese representatives 
presented their official views of the 
submarine question. Senator Schanzer, 
speaking for Italy, supported the French 
contention that the submarine was a 
defensive weapon necessary to protect 
the lines of communication upon which 
Italy depended. The Italian delegation, 
observed the Senator, thought that a 
Conference involving only five of the 
world's navies could not settle a ques-
tion which concerned so many others. 
In spite of its appreciation of the 
humanitarian arguments of the British 
delegation, concluded Schanzer, Italy 
could not associate itself with the pro-
posal for submarine abolition. 3 6 
The Japanese deleg~te, Masanao 
Hanihara, presented similar arguments 
regarding the positive defensive capabili-
ties of the submarine. As far as the 
legitimacy of the weapon was con-
cerned, Hanihara pointed out that "any 
weapoIl might become illegitimate if 
used without restriction.,,3 7 Further-
more, for an insular nation like Japan, 
submarines were relatively inexpensive, 
yet effective. Japan would favor, there-
fore, "more vigorous international rules 
governing their proper use. ,,3 8 
Hughes reinforced this position by 
reading the report on submarines 
adopted by the Advisory Committee of 
the American delegation on 1 Decem-
ber.39 As a man-of-war, the submarine 
has a "very vital part to play,,,40 and as 
a scout, continued the report, "the 
submarine has great possibilities ... it 
has value, a legitimate use, and no 
nation can decry its employment in this 
fashion ... 41 Again alluding to the Japa-
nese threat in the Pacific, the report 
declared that although the United States 
would never undertake unlimited sub-
marine warfare, delay tactics until major 
fleet operations began could, 
... at some future time result in 
the United States holding its out-
lying possessions. If these colonies 
once fall, the expenditure of men 
necessary to recapture them will 
be tremendous and may result in a 
drawnout war which would really 
be a United States defeat. The 
United States needs a large subma-
rine force to protect its inter-
ests.42 
The United States had completely 
reversed its position on submarine aboli-
tion from that taken 3 years earlier at 
the Paris Peace Conference. England was 
now without support in her campaign to 
abolish the submarine. 
At the next meeting of the commit-
tee (23 December) Admiral de Bon, 
speaking for his country, indicated that 
the Conference could not "reasonably 
limit submarine tonnage," but if such a 
limit were to be fixed, the American 
proposal of 90,000 tons was "the abso-
lute minimum for all navies who may 
want to have a submarine force.,,43 
Great Britain responded by accusing 
France of favoring the submarine be-
cause of its ability to wage a successful 
war against merchant fleets.44 Balfour 
then attempted to win Italy to the 
abolitionist point of view by pointing 
out that country's vulnerability to sub-
marine operations in its dependence on 
seaborne commerce. Italy, however, sug-
gested that the best course to follow 
would be to place restrictions on the 
offensive operations of submarines 
rather than abandon what they con-
sidered a defensive weapon.4 5 
The confrontation between Great 
Britain and France over the question of 
submarine abolition dominated the 
seventh session (24 December) of the 
committee also. Sarraut restated 
France's position that "An agreement 
had been reached on the reduction of 
offensive naval armaments, but the 
question of means of defense [i.e., 
submarines] must be left to the con-
sideration of the countries inter-
ested.,,46 Balfour countered by asking, 
"Against whom is this submarine fleet 
being built? What purpose is it to serve? 
What danger to France is it intended to 
guard against?" These were questions, 
noted Balfour, to which no satisfactory 
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answers had been given, and the implica-
tions were a definite threat to British 
seapower.47 
Secretary Hughes terminated the de-
bate on the abolition of the submarine 
by saying that further discussion of the 
matter was futile and that it was im-
possible to "expect a result favorable to 
the adoption of ... a resolution to 
abolish the submarine.,,48 
With the abolition controversy 
ended, the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament turned its attention to the 
problem of quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions to be placed on submarines. 
As England had rejected the original 
American tonnage figure of 90,000 tons 
as being too large, Secretary Hughes 
now proposed that both Great Britain 
and the United States accept 60,000 
tons as their maximum submarine ton-
nage while France, Italy, and Japan 
maintain their present tonnage as the 
maximum. 49 
This offer was readily accepted by 
the British delegation at the next 
meeting of the committee (also 24 
December) but met with considerable 
argument from the other powers. Ad-
miral de Bon stated that a minimum of 
90 submarines (90,000 tons) were re-
quired to safeguard French security. To 
reduce their force below this limit, "was 
equivalent to abolishing the whole 
French program ... ,,50 The admiral in-
formed the committee that the figures 
were so far below what they had origi-
nally contemplated that the French 
delegation must refer them to Paris for 
study. Italy announced that she would 
accept the new tonnage figures only on 
the condition that they represent parity 
with France.51 The Japanese delegate 
pointed out that their acceptance of the 
original tonnage allowance of 54,000 
tons called for a considerable sacrifice 
and compromise on their part and was 
the minimum tonnage acceptable to 
them. 5 2 Japan was so remotely situ-
ated, concluded her spokesman, "thatit 
must be evident to all that her subma-
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rines could not constitute a menace to 
any nation.,,5 3 Secretary Hughes termi-
nated the discussion on submarine 
limitation at this juncture to await the 
French reply to the new American 
proposal. 
On the following Tuesday (27 De-
cember) Admiral Pratt submitted to 
Roosevelt a memorandum reviewing the 
discussions in the Committee of Fifteen 
since its formation by the Committee 
on Limitation of Armament. Pratt 
noted that "a certain amount of tension 
had resulted owing to the uncompro-
mising attitude of Great Britain and 
France on the submarine question,,,5 4 
and suggested that they put the subma-
rine question "under the ice to cool" 
and stop discussing it.5 5 Also, in recom-
mending that the question of other 
auxiliary tonnage (cruisers, destroyers 
et cetera) not be raised until the subma-
rine question was settled, Pratt warned 
that the United States should guard 
against the setting of a precedent by 
allowing Japan an out of ratio tonnage 
in an attempt to yield to France, for 
that country (France) might make a 
similar claim at a later date.5 6 
Admiral Pratt was of the oplIDon 
that the submarine problem adversely 
affected aircraft carrier tonnage limita-
tion which, in his mind, was second 
only to capital ship tonnage. It was 
important to settle this question first, 
and whether or not a decision was later 
reached in submarines, the purpose of 
the Conference would have been fairly 
accomplished. "The ratio is the Big 
Thing of this conference," wrote Pratt. 
"It is the power back of us which 
assures the Anglo-Saxon peoples that 
the rule of Constitutional government 
and its ideals during years of peace or of 
war shall be the law of land and of sea." 
To emphasize his point regarding the 
importance of the ratio, Pratt offered 
his resignation if it was departed 
from.57 
During the evening of the same day 
(27 December), Hughes received a letter 
from the ~rj.tish delegation (Balfour) 
summarizing that country's position re-
garding the submarine. Balfour re-
iterated the British desire for total 
abolition. If this was not possible, how-
ever, they would favor any diminution 
in their number. But, noted Balfour, 
"no mere diminution in their numbers 
during peace would relieve us from the 
necessity of devising and preparing all 
practicable methods of dealing with 
them in war, so that no limitation of 
anti-submarine vessels would seem con-
sistent with our national safety.,,58 
Antisubmarine vessels could, of course, 
include just about every type of vessel 
except capital ships, aircraft carriers, 
and fleet support ships. 
That this was the only policy Eng-
land had chosen to pursue was con-
firmed by the contents of a secret 
dispatch from Churchill to Balfour sent 
at the time of Balfour's initial pleas for 
submarine abolition. This dispatch was 
not made public until it was mentioned 
by Churchill during a speech in the 
House of Commons in 1930.59 
In this letter, Churchill lauded the 
British delegation's decision to press for 
total abolition of the submarine. "We 
apprehend, however," continued 
Churchill, 
that there is very little chance of 
the abolition of submarines being 
agreed upon, and in this event we 
must insist at all costs upon abso-
lute freedom in regard to the 
character and number of all ves-
sels under, say, 10,000 tons. We 
cannot, in the face of French 
freedom to construct a great sub-
marine fleet, to say nothing of the 
submarine and cruiser concentra-
tion of other powers, enter into 
any agreement fettering our 
liberty to build whatever numbers 
and classes of cruisers and anti-
submarine warfare craft we may 
consider necessary .... 
Even at the cost of a complete 
rupture, we feel certain that you 
will not agree to any restriction in 
this sphere without previous con-
sultation with the cabinet.6 0 
It is evident that the submarine was the 
key to any meaningful limitation be-
yond the agreement already reached for 
capital ships. 
Formal discussion of submarine 
limitation resumed 28 December with 
the ninth gathering of the Committee 
on Limitation of Armament. France 
aggravated an already strained situation 
by refusing to accept the status quo 
offer (31,500 tons) for submarine ton-
nage made by Hughes at an earlier 
meeting (24 December). Sarraut in-
formed the committee that his govern-
ment had concluded that 
... it is impossible to accept a 
limitation below 350,000 tons for 
auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons 
for submarines, without im-
periling the vital interests of the 
country and its colonies and the 
safety of their naval life. The 
French Delegation has been in-
structed to consent to no conces-
sion in regard to the above 
figures.61 
Even though the French indicated 
their acceptance of the capital ship 
allowance assigned to them (175,000 
tons) in the same announcement and 
thereby kept the ratio intact, there was 
little warmth in the remarks accorded 
the French decision on the submarine. 
Hughes was "disappointed" with the 
French statement. If France had 90,000 
tons of submarines, both the English 
and Americans would have to greatly 
increase their submarine fleets. This, 
noted Hughes, could hardly be called 
limitation or reduction62 and raised the 
serious question whether anything 
might be accomplished in regard to 
submarines and auxiliaries. 
Balfour was "profoundly dis-
appointed" and pointed out that the 
threefold increase in submarine tonnage 
proposed by France would make her 
equal to the major naval powers. This he 
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viewed as a "somewhat singular contri-
bution to a Conference called for the 
diminution of armament.,,63 Why, con-
tinued Balfour, did a fleet of capital 
ships of 175,000 tons require 90,000 
tons of submarines to scout for it and 
protect it? It was perfectly obvious, 
stated the English representative, "that 
the proposed 90,000· tons of submarines 
were intended to destroy commerce." It 
should be perfectly clear, concluded 
Balfour, that if the French were per-
mitted to build 90,000 tons of subma-
rines, "no limitation of any kind on 
auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with 
submarines could be admitted by the 
government which he represented.,,64 
The division in attitude toward the 
submarine engendered by the French 
refusal to accept limitation of their 
submarine force and the British plan to 
maintain freedom in constructing aux-
iliary craft rendered any agreement to 
limit the tonnage of submarines at the 
Conference impossible. Realizing this, at 
a meeting of the Committee of Fifteen 
on the same day, the various national 
representatives "agreed to disagree" on 
the submarine issue. 
The Committee of Limitation of 
Armament reconvened for its afternoon 
session at 3:30, and following the dis-
cussion of a proposed limitation of 
cruiser tonnage and maximum gun cali-
ber for use aboard cruisers, Hughes 
suggested that the committee consider 
the action to be expressed by the 
powers as regards the illegal use of 
submarines. Elihu Root then presented 
three resolutions designed to place cer-
tain restrictions upon the operations of 
submarines through universal adherence 
to international laws65 regarding the 
search, seizure, and destruction of mer-
chant vessels in time of war; the pro-
hibition of the use of submarines as 
commerce destroyers; and the outlawing 
of unrestricted submarine warfare. 6 6 
The reading of the resolutions garnered 
enthusiastic and warm replies from the 
assembled representatives, but all the 
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nations-except Great Britain-wished 
to study them in detail and deferred 
discussion until a later date.6 7 
At the next meeting of the commit-
tee (20 December) Admiral de Bon, 
supported by the Italian and Japanese 
representatives, recommended that the 
resolutions be submitted to a group of 
jurists for further study. Root, however, 
declared that neither he nor the resolu-
tions were "going to be buried -under a 
committee of lawyers." "Either the 
delegates assembled here," stated Root, 
" ... must speak clearly and intel-
ligently the voice of humanity which 
had sent them here, and to which they 
must report, or that voice would speak 
for itself, and speaking without them, 
would be their condemnation.,,6 8 
Roosevelt described the debate over the 
resolutions as "voluble and acrid" but 
personally did not think the submarine 
resolution (No.2) amounted to much. 
It was, however, the "kind of a subject 
which gives to diplomats an opportunity 
for cantankerous disagreement.,,6 9 
On 30 December the committee 
opened discussion on the second Root 
resolution relating to the elimination of 
the submarine as a commerce destroyer. 
This meeting was the setting for one of 
the most heated exchanges between 
Great Britain and France due, in part, to 
a series of articles in Revue Maritime, 
one of which was written by a Capitaine 
de Fregate Castex and published in 
January 1920.70 The series, entitled 
"Synthese de la Guerre Sous-Marine" 
(Synthesis of the Submarine War), was 
cited by Lord Lee to support the British 
interpretation of French intentions, i.e., 
the submarines were not for defensive 
purposes, as the French claimed, but for 
offense and that the French favored a 
submarine war on commerce as a legiti-
mate weapon in time of war. The 
Germans, wrote Castex, were absolutely 
justified in resorting to unrestricted 
submarine warfare and to neglect to do 
so would have been to commit a great 
blunder. The French writer concluded, 
stated Lee, with the observation that 
the instrument is finally at hand that 
would "overthrow for good and all the 
naval power of England. ,,71 
Lee stated that he hoped these were 
not the views of the French Govern-
ment and that he expected immediate 
repudiation. He also observed that there 
was only one way that the French could 
effectively disavow these statements and 
that was by adopting the resolutions 
proposed by the American delegation. It 
was only through such action that they 
could remove the British feelings of 
apprehension and bitterness. 
Admiral de Bon was the first to reply 
for France. He stated that he was glad 
to know the basis for the misunder-
standing that had lasted so long between 
the two countries. The Castex article, 
asserted de Bon, "in no way repre-
sented ... the views of the French 
Navy. This article, written by a man of 
'letters,' was, in the eyes of the French 
Delegation," a "monstrosity," and he 
formally repudiated it in the name of 
the French Navy. 72. Chairman Hughes 
then put aside any further discussion of 
the Root resolutions until the delega-
tions had received advice from their 
respective governments. 7 3 
When the discussion of the Root 
resolutions resumed on 5 January, so 
did the battle OL semantics. The only 
issue of real consequence arose when 
Japan questioned the resolutions on the 
use of submarines for blockading pur-
poses.74 Italy and Japan were both 
opposed to Balfour's position that pro-
hibition was the intent of the resolu-
tion. As the "conflict raged without 
success," Roosevelt overheard a remark 
passed from Sarraut to de Bon to the 
effect that he would be glad to remain 
silent and let Italy and Japan fight 
France's battles. 7 5 
Despite the protracted debate on the 
Root resolutions, they were finally 
approved and adopted during the 15th 
and 16th meetings (5 and 6 January) of 
the committee76 and incorporated into 
a separate Treaty Regarding the Use of 
Submarines and Noxious Gases in War-
fare. 77 Following the meeting of 5 
January, Roosevelt had strongly urged 
Hughes to exclude them from the naval 
treaty because " ... they deal with in-
ternationallaw and suggest amendments 
to international law. [and] ... are not a 
generic part of our treaty which is 
composed of stipulations concerning 
matters over which we have no con-
trol. 78 
The submarine resolutions were laid 
before the entire Conference during the 
fifth plenary session (1 February) by 
Elihu Root and subsequently approved. 
Just prior to the reading of the treaty 
incorporating the resolutions to the 
assembled representatives, Root ex-
plained to Captain Rodgers, Chairman 
of the General Board, that the resolu-
tions were designed to "meet public 
opinion with regard to [the] horrors 
and lawlessness of the Germans. " 
In his presentation before the Con-
ference, Root pointed out that the 
treaty "undertakes further to stigmatize 
violations of these rules ... as violation 
of the laws of war which, as between 
these five great Powers and all other 
civilized nations who shall give their 
adherence thereto shall henceforth be 
punished as an act of piracy.,,79 The 
acceptance of the treaty closed the 
subject of submarine limitation but was 
ratified by only four of the powers 
(France refused) and consequently 
never became binding. With the defeat 
of this treaty through lack of ratifica-
tion, the only accomplishment of the 
Washington Conference regarding the 
limitation or restriction of submarines 
was eliminated. The Conference ad-
journed on 6 February 1922 after the 
adoption of 13 resolutions and seven 
treaties. 
A major ~ccomplishment of the 
Washington Conference was the reo 
placing of the Anglo·Japanese alliance 
with a pledge between the United 
States, Britain, Japan, and France to 
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respect each other's rights in their island 
possessions in the Pacific (Four Power 
Treaty, 13 December 1921). The na-
tions represented at the Conference also 
agreed to respect China's independence 
and to uphold the principle of equal 
industrial and commercial opportunity 
in that country, thus formally accepting 
America's Open Door policy in China 
(Nine Power Treaty, 6 February 1922). 
A third achievement was, of course, 
naval limitations as outlined in the Five 
Power Treaty also approved on 6 Feb-
ruary 1922_ This agreement fixed the 
status quo in fortifications in the West-
ern Pacific, established a capital ship 
construction holiday, made provisions 
for the scrapping of certain battleships 
and battle cruisers of the three major 
naval powers, set tonnage limitations for 
certain ship types (capital ships, aircraft 
carriers), limited the maximum gun cali-
ber for cruisers, and established the 
naval strength ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 
on aircraft carriers and capital ships.8 0 
The major failure of the Washington 
Conference was its inability to reach a 
limitation agreement on the submarine, 
the key to the limitation of the re-
maining classes of surface warships. For 
the agreements at the Conference on 
battleships and aircraft carriers to be 
effective in reducing the chances of war, 
it was necessary that these two types of 
vessels be universally accepted as the 
key factor of seapower. Furthermore, 
limitation of these types only enhanced 
the combatant value of the other un-
limited vessels. Capt. Dudley W. Knox 
observed that "It is very, very doubt-
ful," whether this failure [to limit sub-
marines] did not actually nullify the 
effects of limitation on battle ships and 
air-craft [sic] carriers .. _ ,,8 1 
Any contribution the so-called sub-
marine treaty might have made to the 
limitation of armaments would have 
been at best psychological, backed as it 
was only by "world opinion," for it 
made the submarine "an ordinary ship 
of war and took from it the stigma of 
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being a murderous and foul weapon. ,,82 
As Admiral Sims wrote to Raymond L. 
Buell, author of The Washington Con-
ference, any nation menaced by defeat 
and domination, "would use the subma-
rine to save itself; ... the 'tremendous 
power of public opinion' would not 
prevent it being used ... ,,83 
Another pessimistic evaluation of the 
treaty came from a paper written several 
days after the Conference ended by 
Adm. William V. Pratt of the U.S. Navy. 
The treaty, wrote Pratt, "is not practical 
[and] will not work." Pratt likened the 
submarine treaty to the Prohibition law, 
for it was forcing something on the 
majority of nations which they did not 
or would not want in war. The treaty, 
concluded the admiral, "is made to be 
broken, and this in itself leads to a 
disregard for the law .... ,,8 4 
Admiral Sims concurred in this nega-
tive evaluation of the submarine treaty. 
It would probably prove a failure, wrote 
Sims, "because it is really impossible to 
understand what it means.... It is 
useless to talk about the rules of warfare 
if the terms used are not accurately 
defined. . . ,,85 
The rather unrealistic attempt to 
restrict the submarine by international 
law enforced only by world public 
opinion was hardly an adequate substi-
tute for strict limitation by tonnage or 
size of the individual submarine or of a 
nation's submersible fleet. Lacking any 
regulations upon construction of this 
type of vessel, it was clear that those 
nations which chose to do so were free 
to engage in unlimited building pro-
grams not only in this category but in 
the other unrestricted classes as well. 
With competition underway anew, it 
soon became apparent that further in-
ternational attempts to limit naval arma-
ments were necessary if the naval arms 
race was to be halted. 
The lessons from the attempts to 
limit the submarine at Washington 
should be abundantly clear. If a weapon 
lends itself to the protection or ad-
vancement of a nation's interests, 
meaningful limitation is doubtful. 
Similarly, if political differences be-
tween nations cannot be settled, there 
can be little genuine hope that im-
portant disarmament agreements can 
be reached. 
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